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A B S T R A C T
This article explores the relevance of the concept of Silk Road for understanding the pat-
terns of trade and exchange between China, Eurasia and the Middle East. It is based on
ethnographic ﬁeldwork in the city of Yiwu, in China’s Zhejiang Province. Yiwu is a node in
the global distribution of Chinese ‘small commodities’ and home to merchants and traders
from across Asia and beyond. The article explores the role played by traders from Afghan-
istan in connecting the city of Yiwu to markets and trading posts in the world beyond. It
seeks to bring attention to the diverse types of networks involved in such forms of trade,
as well as their emergence and development over the past thirty years.
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1. Introduction
‘Our country is at the heart of Asia’, Zia, an Afghan trader
in his mid-50s who works in St Petersburg’s Apraksin Dvor
market remarked to me in December 2015. ‘Yet if the heart
has all the qualities that allow the entire body to function,
so too is the heart – as pressure increases and the veins block
– the place where if one thing goes wrong the entire body
fails’.
A succession of policy initiatives announced in recent
years depict Afghanistan as a future regional hub on the ‘New
Silk Road’. Such initiatives, including the USA’s New Silk
Roads strategy launched by Hillary Clinton at the UN General
Assembly in September 2011, are a marked improvement
on depictions of Afghanistan that circulated in the inter-
national media in the 2000s as an isolated, backward and
mediaeval state. Representing Afghanistan as a regional hub
correctly brings attention to the country’s historic place on
long-distance trade routes, as well as to the critical signif-
icance of trade, exchange, and the wider world to Afghan
culture and society.
Yet it is also undeniable that talk of Afghanistan reas-
suming its past status as a pivot between Europe and Asia
is both utopian and politically cynical. Levels of violence
in Afghanistan have never been as high over the past
sixteen years of international intervention as they are
today. New threats to Afghanistan’s security, including the
activities of ISIS in the east of the country, and the rise of
international militant groups in the north, arise on a
day-to-day basis. I have observed this at ﬁrst hand: vil-
lages and districts in the north of Afghanistan that I used
to visit at ease until four years ago are now in the hands
of militants. Afghanistan’s economy furthermore is palpi-
tating in the wake of the withdrawal of international
forces and funding and the rise of insecurity. One indica-
tion of this is the streams of educated and resourceful
youth leaving the country in search of a better life. In
spite of all of this, international opinion formers are
conﬁdent enough to envisage a prosperous, stable, and
globally connected Afghanistan.
If one thing remains stable in recent international
efforts to engage with Afghanistan, it is the disjunction
between the worlds inhabited by policy makers and those
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by local people. The unwillingness to consult with, seek to
understand, and learn from local actors is what stands in
the path of a stable Afghanistan. The USA and its allies erred
repeatedly in the way in which they engaged with Afghan-
istan’s society during the long Taliban insurgency – seeing
‘traditional tribal structures’ where thirty years of war and
conﬂict had in fact wreaked havoc and changed society ir-
remediably, they armed the wrong partners, implemented
the wrong policies, and traumatic violence was unleashed
as a result (Marsden and Hopkins, 2012).
The New Silk Road strategy is likely to have similarly neg-
ative consequences: utopian projects of international
development that overlook on-the-ground realities fre-
quently bring untold misery to those whose lives they were
designed to improve (cf. Karrar, 2016). There however is no
shortage of actors on the ground who possess a great deal
of insight about the possibilities of and barriers to sustain-
able forms of Eurasian trade. Afghan trader-refugees, men
like Zia, are busy at work in markets and trading spaces
across Eurasia: in Moscow, St Petersburg, and Krasnodar in
Russia; Odessa, Kiev and Kharkiv in Ukraine; and Du-
shanbe, Bishkek, and Alma Ata in Central Asia, traders of
Afghan background are leading players in the import and
wholesale of commodities. Many of these commodities come
from China – where Afghan traders are also an estab-
lished feature of commercial cities such as Urumqi in the
West, Guangzhou in the South, and Yiwu in the East. But
Afghan traders are also experts in facilitating the import of
Iranian, Pakistani, and Indian commodities to Central Asian
markets thereby connecting, in a way that few others are
able, this region’s notoriously complex markets toWest and
South Asia.
Why sell the dream of a ‘New Silk Road’ when a multi-
plicity of silk – or perhaps more aptly nylon – roads already
exist? Why impose a utopian vision of a connected world
on people who are already familiar in sophisticated and in-
timate ways with the dynamics of a complex region? Why
are communities that obviously have so much to offer into
understanding the role played by trade in connecting Asia
and Europe absent from the discourse of the New Silk Road?
If the answer is because this category of actor is simplis-
tically thought of as being either drug smugglers or people
traﬃckers then the time has come to think again. As has
been amply seen inside Afghanistan, the failure to consult
actors on the basis of one-sided images – be such actors
former Taliban ideologues or ‘communist’ oﬃcials – results
only in negative consequences for the country as sources
of experience and expertise are dismissed (Marsden and
Hopkins, 2012).
This article focuses on the role played by traders of
Afghan background in facilitating commercial exchanges
not only between China and Afghanistan but also a wide
range of settings in Eurasia, the Middle East, and East
Asia. It builds on an earlier work in which explored the
importance of the Chinese city of Yiwu as a node for the
activities of transregional Afghan merchants (Marsden,
2016a). In this article, I shift my focus from the study of
the node to the nature of the networks that emanate from
the city and connect it to the wider world. An emerging
body of scholarship exists on the importance of bringing
to scholarly recognition the connections that exist between
Asia settings (e.g. Amrith, 2013), as well as the role played
by newer and older types of networks in facilitating such
forms of connection and circulation. Here I build on these
developments in the wider literature in Asian studies, and
seek to document that wide range of economic niches
that Afghan niches occupy both in China and its con-
nected markets, as well as analyse the character of the
networks they form and sustain. In so doing, the article
seeks to bring attention to the diverse histories and expe-
riences of commerce, mobility, and exchange that inform
and underpin the activities of Afghan traders in what
might be thought of as the countries of the New Silk
Road.
2. Background and setting
2.1. Trans-regional Afghan merchants
A consideration of the biographies of individual Afghan
traders who are commercially active in Yiwu reveals two
broad sources of historical inﬂuence on the formation of the
networks they form. On the one hand, Afghan traders em-
phasise that they are uniquely suited to being global
commodity traders because of the role that people from the
territories that currently make-up Afghanistan have played
as trans-regional merchants between South and Central Asia
(e.g. Haniﬁ, 2011; Hopkins, 2009). On the other hand, many
of the traders also say that they have become traders because
of their experience of conﬂict and dispersal resulting from
the ‘cold war’ (jang-i sard) that ‘turned hot’ (garm shud) in
Afghanistan.
Afghan traders do not form a homogeneous ‘social group’,
but are differentiated according to markers of status, wealth,
and position in trading hierarchies; such forms of differ-
ence also intersect with, yet are never simply deﬁned by,
the traders’ ‘ethnic’ and linguistic identities. Traders do iden-
tify with particular ‘ethnic groups’ (e.g. Turkmen, Uzbek,
Tajik, and Pashtun), yet most if not all traders have busi-
ness partnerships withmenwho identify with communities
different from their own. The past ideological and politi-
cal aﬃliations of the traders also reﬂect Afghanistan’s
modern political history: some worked as state oﬃcials and
were directly aﬃliated to the Afghan socialist movement
(through membership of the People’s Democratic Party of
Afghanistan) and trained in ‘Party Schools’ in Central Asia,
others fought on the side of anti-Soviet mujahidin
organisations. More recently, many traders form commer-
cial relations with people from political factions they once
opposed.
The networks are therefore inﬂuenced both by the forms
of modern cultural nationalism promoted by political
organisations such as the People’s Democratic Party of Af-
ghanistan (PDPA) and by the historic participation of Afghans
in distinctively Muslim networks of commerce and intel-
lectual exchange (e.g. Cooke & Lawrence, 2005). The
identities of those who make-up the networks are also in-
formed by the past participation of many of the traders in
the global ‘socialist ecumene’ (Bayly, 2007). All of these
varied inﬂuences are visible in themulti-dimensional nature
of the traders’ self-understandings.
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2.2. Yiwu: global trade node
Yiwu, in China’s Zheijang province and about 2 hours by
high-speed rail from Shanghai, is a city of approximately
2 million inhabitants that is home to the International Trade
City or Yiwu Market, founded in 1982 and currently under
the administration of the Zhejiang China Commodities City
Group Co., Ltd. Yiwu has come to play a central role over
the past decade in ‘globalization from the bottom-up’
(Mathews, Lins Ribeiro, & Alba Vega, 2012), especially in re-
lationships to its status as a hub for the worldwide trade
in low-grade Chinese commodities (Marsden, 2016a). Yiwu
Market is made of a complex of twomarkets: Futian Market
and Huangyuan Garment Market (opened in 2011). Futian
market is divided into ﬁve ‘districts’ that hold a total of
70,000 shops selling 1,700,000 different types of Chinese-
made ‘small commodities’ for the wholesale market. The
commodities sold range from toys to bags and purses, sou-
venirs, hardware items, and jewellery. The market is
organised spatially according to the different types of com-
modities traded there. Huangyuan Market hosts another
5700 shops selling exclusively jeans, sport wears and other
types of garments. According to the market’s website, these
goods are exported to more than 200 countries across the
world, and approximately 1500 containers leave the city each
day. Most shops in the International Trade City either pur-
chase the goods from factories located elsewhere in China,
and store them in warehouses in the city, or are outlets for
particular factories.
It might be assumed that the enormous global trade in
low-grade commodities is overwhelmingly organised re-
motely through multi-national companies, on-line
purchasing, and electronic money transfers. A visit to Yiwu,
however, demonstrates just how far this neat vision of the
ordered movement of goods lies from the real worlds in-
habited bymany commodity traders. Travelling to and being
physically present in Yiwu is central to the practices of global
commodity traders, who must contend with the risks of
being sold faulty goods or seeing the arrival of these in their
home ports delayed by the production process, customs of-
ﬁcials, and port closures (e.g. Bodomo, 2012). Traders from
all over the world, especially Latin America, Asia, the Middle
East, and Africa, travel to Yiwu to provision goods and export
these to the markets in which they work. Yiwu thus is a
major meeting point for such trading networks, and itself
a ‘site of interaction’ for traders (Harper & Amrith, 2012).
In addition to the great range of foreignmerchants active
in the city, Yiwu is also home to communities of people of
Muslim background from elsewhere in China, especially Hui
Chinese-speaking Muslims (many being migrants from
Yunnan) and Uyghurs from various locales across Xinjiang
province (notably the ancient trans-Himalayan trading post
of Yarkand).
Having introduced the general histories of trade and mi-
gration that inform the identities of traders from
Afghanistan, and presented contextual material on the city
of Yiwu and its importance to the world trade in ‘small com-
modities’ in the remainder of the article, I focus on three
particular types of Afghan trading networks that are active
in China. I bring attention to the contrasting histories of these
networks and highlight the varyingways inwhich these have
played a critical role in connecting different world regions
to one another.
3. Network 1: from party school to Afghan bazaar –
Yiwu, Afghan traders and the former Soviet Union
Perhaps the most visible of the networks of Afghan
traders in Yiwu is that which connects the city to the
markets of the former Soviet Union. It is quite usual to hear
traders of Afghan background in Yiwu talking about the costs
of doing business in the Russian Federation or the diﬃcul-
ties that come with working in Ukraine in the present day.
Indeed, a glance at the signboards of transport companies
above the city’s streets points to the important role that
Afghan traders play in freighting commodities to the post-
Soviet world: transport companies with clearly Afghan
names advertise themselves as shipping agents for the ports
of Moscow, St Petersburg and Odessa.
The basis of much of this commercial activity lies in the
history of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Af-
ghanistan in the 1970s and 1980s. Thousands of Afghans
were educated and trained, thanks to bursaries and other
forms of assistance in universities, polytechnics, and tech-
nical centres in the 5 Central Asian republics, Ukraine, and
Russia from the 1970s until the collapse of the PDPA (Pe-
ople’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan) government. Some
stayed there and married local women; others returned to
Afghanistan, served in the country’s state and security forces,
and then returned to the towns in which they had studied
after Afghanistan’s civil war in the early 1990s – the precise
moment at which there was considerable scope for trading
opportunities in the countries of the former Soviet Union.
As Caroline Humphrey has documented (Humphrey, 2002),
major opportunities for trade were created by the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union. More particularly, the outbreak
of a nearly decade-long civil war in Tajikistan after 1991 led
to the formation of ‘interstitial spaces within the larger eco-
nomic structures’ in which Afghans were able to ‘carve their
own niches of importance’. The continuing importance of
Afghan traders to Tajikistan after the cessation of the war
rested partly on the ‘incumbency advantage’ that they
derived from having carved out niches earlier. Many traders
who initially established themselves in Tajikistan used the
proﬁts they made in the country to move to settings else-
where in the Soviet Union such as Moscow, Kiev, Odessa,
andMinsk. They deemed these settings as beingmore secure
locations both for their trading activities and for their fami-
lies given ongoing conﬂict in Tajikistan (Marsden, 2016b).
Afghans who turned to trade in Tajikistan and else-
where in Central Asia, moreover, were not aliens to the
unique conditions that the region presented to them. Many
of the menwho nowwork as traders in Tajikistan were edu-
cated in Soviet universities and professional training
institutes, both in Dushanbe and elsewhere in the Soviet
Union. As a result, they enjoyed ties and relations with local
people and state oﬃcials; many additionally engaged in
trading activities during their stays as students in the Soviet
Union. Before the Soviet Union’s collapse, these men con-
sequently possessed detailed knowledge about Soviet
markets, states, and consumer preferences, acquiring
forms of entrepreneurial knowledge that were directly
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applicable to the context in which they were working. In
later years, this access to ﬂows of information and power-
holders ‘insulated [them] from competition by the entry
costs of potential rivals, the lower average cost afforded by
its volume of business, the switching costs of its existing
clients and suppliers, and obstacles to coordinating on an
alternative network’ (Kuran, 2011, p. 267). Afghans were also
perceived by local populations as being natural traders and
merchants, not least because of the types of relations that
local people held with them during the Soviet period. Local
informants in Tajikistan, for example, often tell me that
Afghan society accords such respect to traders that even
warring parties cease their conﬂict if they see a trade convoy
(kaﬁlah) approaching the front line. It was in the context
of all of these factors – economic, political, and cultural –
that, in an otherwise ‘poor market situation’, Afghans in Ta-
jikistan came to enjoy ‘a degree of self-regulation and
oligopolistic control’ (Lovejoy, 1982, p. 277).
A great deal of the trade in which Afghanistan was in-
volved in Tajikistan concerned the importance of food
products from Pakistan on the one hand and Iran on the
other. Afghan traders brought staple food products such as
macaroni, tinned products, and confectionary to Tajiki-
stan from Iran; traders working between Pakistan and
Tajikistan imported wheat, sugar, and, in later years, tan-
gerines, among other commodities. During this period, some
of the traders also brought large quantities of goods from
Europe, such as sugar from Poland and used cars from
Germany. In the bazaars of the Russian Federation and
Ukraine – contexts to which many Tajikistan-based traders
moved after earning suﬃcient capital – however the traders
earned a name for importing affordable Chinese ‘small com-
modities’. In the early 1990s, the traders initially travelled
between Russia and Beijing by train, buying commodities
in Harbin, and exporting them to the cities in which they
worked using trucking and rail routes through Siberia. At
the same time, traders also travelled to the city of Urumqi
in Xinjiang Province fromwhere they purchased commodi-
ties, shipped them to Alma Ata in Kazakhstan from where
they arranged their onward transportation. During this
period, some traders also travelled to Dubai in order to pur-
chase Chinese made products which they then transported
by aeroplane to the cities in which they worked, such as
Odessa. By the late 1990s however, Yiwu, with its expand-
ing market in which small commodities were sold, as well
as concentration of traders from South and West Asia who
owned restaurants and trading companies, increasingly
became regarded as an attractive destination for these
traders. Today, apart for traders dealing in clothing and
leather products, who largely purchase commodities in Gua-
ngzhou, Yiwu is the favoured destination for Afghan traders
in the former Soviet Union. A medium sized trader will visit
the city approximately three times a year, while large scale
traders frequently open trading oﬃces in the city to which
a friend or family member is permanently posted.
Of those who travelled to the newly independent states
of the former USSR in the 1990s, many moved on to Europe
and sought refugee status, especially in Germany, Holland
and the UK. Yet, in spite of this signiﬁcant movement of
Afghans out of the former Soviet Union from the early 1990s
onwards, communities of Afghans have continued to be a
vital feature of urban life across this space. The size of such
communities vary: in smaller towns, such as Rostov-on-
Don and Stavropol in southern Russia, or Khujand in
Tajikistan, populations often stand at around 300 souls; in
the bigger cities that are known by Afghans across this world
as being nodes for their activities as traders, notably Odessa
in the Ukraine, Moscow and St Petersburg in Russia, and,
Dushanbe in Tajikistan, communities are often much larger,
frequently in the tens of thousands.
Over the three decades that followed the collapse of the
Soviet Union, migration between the former Soviet Union
and Afghanistan continued: the territories of the shurawi
(Soviet Union) continued to be associated and imagined by
commercially able Afghans with access to capital (or
sarmaiyah) through the lens of trading success. A young
Odessa-based Dari-speaking man from Kunduz in north-
ern Afghanistan remarked to me and another of our friends
(Aman, a Pashto-speaking Khalqi-alligned former police
oﬃcer in his ﬁfties from Jalalabad), ‘we lost the chance of
being educated when we left Afghanistan, and have come
here not to sit in a detention centre and wait for a pass-
port but to make some money and become something’.
Men who left Afghanistan in the early 1990s and then
established themselves as merchants in the shuraviwere fre-
quently, although not always, joined by their family
members. Afghans from very different backgrounds, notably
those with a longer history of commercial life, such as the
children of merchants who had been involved in the oﬃ-
cial barter economy between Afghanistan and the Soviet
Union, also increasingly moved their capital and business
operations to the region, considering it as being a good place
to trade, work, and live. In much the same way as Caroline
and Filippo Osella’s Kerala informants consider the Gulf as
an extension of India (e.g. Osella and Osella 2007), move-
ments across these contexts are of a thick and durable
enough nature for some people to remark that they con-
sider the territories of the former Soviet Union to be an
extension of Afghanistan. ‘I have never been abroad’ (ma
kharij hich na raftim), one woman in her late forties who
currently sells women’s clothing in a neighbourhoodmarket
on the outskirts of Odessa, remarked to me, only seconds
after describing how she had traded alongside her husband
in several Central Asian countries, two cities in Russia, and,
now, in Odessa in the Ukraine.
A handful of these mobile Afghan merchants who trav-
elled to the shurawi in the 1990s are known to have made
very signiﬁcant fortunes; they returned to Afghanistan with
the commencement of the international intervention in 2001
in order to beneﬁt from the economic opportunities that
offered – these men now run banks and airlines in Afghan-
istan. Two are currently under house arrest in Kabul for their
role in the corrupt practices of The Kabul Bank. Other suc-
cessful if less wealthy traders hedged their bets. Maintaining
a business in Moscow or St Petersburg, they would send one
brother back to Afghanistan to either seek employment in
the state or an NGO, or, more likely, to start a construction
or import company, and another to China in order to open
a trading oﬃce or transport company connected to their
family business interests in both Russia and Afghanistan.
A key way for men such as these to register their success
is to say to their compatriots whom they meet during the
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course of trading sorties, ‘I have a life in both Moscow and
Kabul’.
With the continuing instability in Afghanistan, commu-
nities of traders in the former Soviet Union are still being
replenished with new migrants travelling to cities in the
region both with the aim of trading there and of escaping
Afghanistan. These include young men who were em-
ployed as translators for ISAF forces in the country, and had
earned enough money doing so to establish a business in
the shurawi. There are others who have connections of kin
and friendship with established merchants living across the
Commonwealth of Independent States who were willing to
employ such trustworthy newcomers as sellers (furishondah)
in their shops, or to give them goods on credit which could
then be sold in retail markets. Those with signiﬁcant
amounts of capital might also have been invited to become
a business partner (sharik) by an established merchant in
Moscow, Kiev or Odessa. These newmigrants are now found
across the political space, and add another historical layer
to the groups of Afghan communities living across it. The
trading activities of such some individuals have been very
successful, something that is often put down by more es-
tablished Afghans in the region to the newcomers’
experience of Afghanistan and subsequent fearlessness and
capacity for risk-taking. Yet new traders also often com-
plain that because, unlike early waves of Soviet-sympathising
Afghans, they are not formerly educated, speak poor Russian,
and do not enjoy long standing ties with local oﬃcials and
ministries, it is harder for them to establish durable
businesses.
Importantly, in all the so-called ‘Afghan markets’
(afghansky rynok; afghon bozor) that I have visited in the
former Soviet Union, I have also met men who have decided
to leave their lives (and often families) in western Europe
in order to return to being an independent trader in con-
texts where they had previously worked. Moving from
Slough and Rotterdam to Odessa, from Toronto and Utrecht
to Moscow and Dushanbe, and from Oslo to Rostov-on-
Don, these traders all claim that the shurawi-i sabiq (former
Soviet union) offers the possibility for a man to engage in
free work (kar-i azad) in a manner that is impossible in the
tightly controlled markets of western Europe and North
America. Ali, for instance, is a Hazara from the dara-i
Turkmen valley in Parwan. He worked as a taxi driver in
Greenwich for ﬁve years; on earning British citizenship he
travelled to Odessa to start a business in the sale of bags
and suitcases that he purchases from a distant relative who
imports them from China. The search for culturally accept-
able forms of work and labour is not the only reason behind
such moves; young Afghan men deported from countries
in western Europe to ‘home’ in Afghanistan often prefer to
return once more to the cities in which they, or other family
members, had initially learned to trade than to stay in Af-
ghanistan, ‘after somebody has left Afghanistan and got used
to life outside’, it is often remarked to me, ‘return is
impossible’.
The networks of Afghan traders that connect China to
the former Soviet Union are thus distinctive in that they are
founded on the basis of students and state oﬃcials with a
long and intimate history of experience in the region. These
networks are dynamic in that the former Soviet Union is
seen as a fruitful space for making money today, especial-
ly by men based in Afghanistan itself. Finally, many of these
traders aspire to lead a life that bridges simultaneously Af-
ghanistan, the former Soviet world, and the cities of China
in which they work; in this sense, the traders think of them-
selves as being distinctively ‘Eurasian’ traders.
4. Network 2: purveyors of precious stones – Afghan
gemstone dealers across East Asia
Another Afghan trading network that plays important if
far less visible role in the commercial dynamics of Yiwu is
made-up of traders from the north of the country who are
involved in the transportation and sale of minerals, pre-
cious and semi-precious stones to Chinese and international
markets. These traders are particularly active in the sale of
stones that are mined within Afghanistan, such as rubies,
tourmaline, emeralds, and, of course lapis lazuli. Many of
them, however, also purchase stones from other regions,
making yearly visits to nodes in the global market of gem-
stones, such as Bangkok, Hong Kong and Jaipur. Interestingly,
the sourcing of precious and semi-precious stones in such
locales is often undertaken by traders in possession of pass-
ports from either countries in Europe and America (e.g.
Germany, USA, the UK) OR IN East Asia (e.g. Japan, Hong
Kong): such passports make possible the ﬂexible forms of
mobility that are required of such types of commercial ac-
tivity and that are constrained by the holders of Afghanistan
passports. These traders locate themselves in Yiwu not
because it is an important market for the goods in which
they deal, but because the city’s policies allow them to open
trading oﬃces and rent houses at more affordable rates than
other Chinese cities where the trade in gems is more sig-
niﬁcant, such as Guangzhou.
The nature of Afghanistan’s trade in precious and semi-
precious stones has been a cause of much debate in
Afghanistan, and this debate relevels aspects of the iden-
tities and activities of the country’s China-based gemstone
merchants. A recent Global Witness report (Global Witness,
2016) has brought much-needed attention to the plight of
Afghanistan’s lapis lazuli and tourmaline mines, located in
the country’s north-eastern province of Badakhshan. The
report highlights the ways in which the mines have become
a focus of dispute between local ‘strongmen’ and the armed
groups they control; it also claims that funds from themines
have been channelled to militant groups, including the
Taliban, in return for these groups not seeking to directly
capture these vital sources of revenue. According to the
report, there is even a possibility that ISIS ﬁghters, who are
purportedly active in Badakhshan, regard these mines as
being a potential revenue source. Finally, the report also
emphasises the role played by traders from Afghanistan, and
especially the Panjshir valley, which borders Badakhshan,
in the smuggling of lapis to markets across Asia, especial-
ly in Pakistan and China. Overall the report argues that lapis
should be regarded as a ‘conﬂict mineral’ and that there is
therefore an urgent need for further government regula-
tion and control over the mines. The report quite rightly
makes the case for Afghanistan developing laws relating to
the mineral sector: doing so, would allow all of the coun-
try’s people to beneﬁt from its many precious national
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resources, including Badakhshan’s lapis lazuli and
tourmalines.
Firstly, and perhapsmost seriously, the report argues that
lapis lazuli mining is a source of conﬂict in the region
without seeking to assess its relative signiﬁcance in rela-
tionship to other ﬂows of illegal or illicit commodities. Most
obviously, as Jonathan Goodhand (2009) has demon-
strated on the basis of research conducted over several years,
Badakhshan is an important locale for the production of
opium and heroin. The region is also the home of individu-
als and groups involved in the transportation of these drugs
to Tajikistan, and thereon to Russia and the West. At the
same time, Badakhshan’s border with Pakistan also means
that it has been an important region through which Taliban
ﬁghters have passed – a journey, as Giustozzi and Dominique
(2009) have demonstrated, that involves the payment of a
fee (or tax) to local leaders. To isolate lapis as a source of
conﬂict without exploring these other important revenue
providers in the region, or the relationship of these to each
other, renders impossible a fair assessment of the relative
signiﬁcance of the mines to the emergence of current levels
of conﬂict in Badakhshan.
By focusing principally on the strategies and activities
of individual commanders involved in battles for control over
the mind, secondly, the report gives insuﬃcient emphasis
to the signiﬁcance of the wider geopolitical processes af-
fecting Badakhshan today. Badakhshan is located in a
politically precarious region that cuts across not only the
nation-states of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan, but
also the wider regions of South and Central Asia.
Badakhshan’s site in this tense geopolitical environment has
meant that its people have witnessed and played a role in
varying and overlapping forms of conﬂict and dispute over
the past decades. In today’s context, for example, as the
report notes, certain valleys, especially Jurm, have become
the holdouts of international jihadi ﬁghters, especially from
Chechnya and the Central Asian states. These ﬁghters, along
with their families, were forced to leave Pakistan’s Feder-
ally Associated Tribal Areas, after that country’s government
launched a military campaign against them in the wake of
the attack on Karachi Jinnah International airport on June
8th 2014 (carried out by gunmen of Uzbek origin). For the
region’s people, however, these ﬁghters’ presence in their
valleys and villages is often thought of as reﬂecting a more
multidimensional ‘political game’ over which they have little
or no control. An element of this game is what they talk
about as being the opening by ‘theWest’ of a southern front
with Putin’s Russia. Another element, according to traders
from the region with whom I have spoken, arises fromwhat
they say is China’s recognition of Badakhshan’s potential im-
portance for its ‘New Silk Road’ strategy. According to these
traders, a road connecting Badakhshan to China would give
the People’s Republic speedy access to Afghanistan’smarkets,
as well as those beyond. Yet, they say, this prospect is feared
by commercial and political elites in the south of Afghan-
istan who regard the development of this route as
threatening their control of the country’s international trade.
In this context, such traders argue, militant groups have risen
in prominence in Badakhshan and northern Afghanistan. Re-
gardless of whether or not evidence can be mustered that
‘proves’ such claims, the political agency of individuals in
Badakhshan, as elsewhere in Afghanistan, are shaped in
powerful ways by this broader, geopolitical context. As a
trader from the region based in China toldme inMarch 2016,
conﬂict in Badakhshan is about territory (jang-i mantiqawi)
not just about lapis. Assessments of the role played by the
mines in generating conﬂict between these men and their
groups need to be analysed in this wider geopolitical context.
Indeed, Robert Crews (Crews, 2015) argues that a ‘core
feature’ of Afghan nationalism is the commitment that the
country will always have an ‘immense impact on the world’
and the fortune of humanity.
Thirdly, it is of critical signiﬁcance that the report argues
that traders involved in the sale of lapis should not be
‘scapegoated’ by the Afghan government. Yet the report also
highlights the role played by ‘Panjshiri’ smugglers who trans-
port lapis mined in Badakhshan out of the country. To the
best of my knowledge, those involved in transporting lapis
from Afghanistan and dealing in it globally are not ‘Panjshiri’
per se: they hail largely from a few villages in the upper
reaches of the Panjshir valley (most notably Dasht-e Rewat
and Saﬁd Sheer). By labelling these traders collectively as
‘Panjshiri’, a regional group of Farsi speakers most com-
monly associatedwith the Jamiat party and anti-Soviet jihadi
leader Ahmad ShahMassoud, the report feeds into and sim-
plistically builds off the ethnic discourses that are a feature
of much political conﬂict in Afghanistan today.
Moreover, men from these villages have been trading in
lapis for at least the past forty ﬁve years: they think of them-
selves as being traders as much as of ‘Panjshiris’ or the
followers of one or another political faction. One trader aged
about ﬁfty ﬁve and currently based in Hong Kong told me
how he could remember goingwith his father to Badakhshan
in pursuit of lapis in the mid-1970s. Another trader in Hong
Kong, now in his seventies, reminisced that after the coming
to power of themujahidin in 1992, he had shunned the offer
of a position in the government because he considered
himself to be a trader ﬁrst and foremost. Over the years in
which men from the upper reaches of the Panjshir valley
have been involved in the trade in lapis, they have trans-
ported the stone in the context of the invasion of Afghanistan
by the Soviets and the control of the country by the Taliban.
In these circumstances, the traders shifted the routes they
use to move lapis – during the 1970s the stone was trans-
ported in the bottom of trucks full of wood to the Pakistani
city of Peshawar by way of the border post at Landi Kotal;
in the 1980s and 1990s, mule and donkey trains freighted
the stone across multiple mountain passes to the Chitral dis-
trict of northern Pakistan; in recent years, the traders have
taken steps to export the stone directly to China from Kabul
in shipping containers.
These so-called ‘smugglers’ also have an intimate and
in-depth knowledge of the global market for lapis: having
established networks that connect all the world’s nodes of
the market in semi-precious and precious stones (Jaipur,
Hong Kong, Bangkok, Kaifeng in China, and Kofu in Japan),
they are also able to understand the shifting cultural value
attached to lapis in varying parts of the world: when a
popular musician in China wore a set of lapis jewellery, for
example, they told me that the cost of the stone increased
dramatically. Today, prices are so low (as a result of high
levels of export in the 2000s, and a downturn in China’s
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economy) that the traders are shutting up their ware-
houses in Hong Kong and moving their stocks to locations
where rental prices are cheaper.
It is important to recognise that these traders have carried
out their work in a great different range of political condi-
tions, all of which have been characterised by a profound
lack of security, an absence of the rule of law, and a failure
of the government of Afghanistan to develop a coherent
policy not merely towards lapis lazuli and minerals but to
the country’s commercial sector more generally. As the
report correctly suggests, these traders should not be
scapegoated. More crucially, perhaps, the signiﬁcance of their
knowledge and expertise for the future of themineral sector
in Afghanistan deserves greater recognition.
This brief consideration of the activities of Afghan gem-
stone dealers in China then reveals important contrasts with
the case of the country’s merchants based in the Soviet
Union. Most obviously, the gemstone dealers’ relation-
ships to one another are based less on the shared experience
of education or state service than on their being from spe-
ciﬁc villages in Afghanistan whose populations are known
to have an expertise in understanding stones and the in-
ternational trades associated with them. The networks
therefore extend out from particular geographical points in
Afghanistan and the traders have extensive knowledge of
one another’s personal and familial histories. Secondly, while
the traders who move goods between China and the Soviet
Union claim they do not have the skills to trade in Afghan-
istan, for gemstone traders, familiarity with the forms of
local, national and geopolitical dynamics affecting Afghan-
istan is absolutely essential. A third major difference is that
while the traders between China and the former Soviet
Union have established paths and infrastructures for trade
between these two contexts over many years, the gem-
stone traders in addition to acting in established nodes (such
as in Kaifeng, Bangkok or Jaipur) are always simultane-
ously active in searching out new sources of stones and new
markets for them. During my visits to Hong Kong, for in-
stance, I had met traders who had travelled to Mexico and
Peru in order to purchase tourmalines, as well as to Zambia
to explore the gold or diamond market. These networks are
therefore rarely associated with establishing communities
of merchants outside of Afghanistan, but characterisedmore
by the ever-changing movements of individual merchants
and their business companions.
5. Network 3: supplying the hajjis – Afghan Turkmen
and Uzbeks between Saudi Arabia and Yiwu
A ﬁnal Afghan trading network that is often talked about
by traders from Afghanistan based in Yiwu as being suc-
cessful and established connects the markets of the Gulf,
especially Jeddah in Saudi Arabia, with China. Traders of
Afghan background are major exporters of clothing and also
machine-made carpets from China to Saudi Arabia, and the
sale of these commodities is mostly connected to the great
hajj pilgrimage during which Muslim pilgrims purchase
items such as these as gifts for their relatives and friends.
From the perspective of Afghan traders based in Yiwu, their
compatriots who work in Jeddah are some of the wealthi-
est and involved in the most stable and high scale trading
activities: ‘a small business in Jeddah’, I was often told in
Yiwu, ‘means at least 10 containers of goods transported
between China and Saudi per month’.
During four months of research in Yiwu in 2016, I met
several traders from Afghanistan who told me of their work
in Saudi Arabia. The majority of these traders identify them-
selves as being ethnically Uzbek and Turkmen, and as having
been born in Afghanistan northern provinces, especially
Balkh, Kunduz and Jowzjan. The family histories of these
families however are also informed by migration and mo-
bility. Most of themmen I have spoken to have told me that
their grandfathers came to what is currently Afghanistan
from their homes and villages in Central Asia after the region
was incorporated into the USSR in the 1920s. Trade was also
important to the livelihoods of these families over the long
term: before their migration to Afghanistan they were in-
volved in animal husbandry and also the trade in pelts to
Russia; after moving to Afghanistan they continued to be
involved not merely in the trade of lamb pelt (karakul), but
also of meat, carpets, and animal skins. Indeed, between the
1960s and 1980s some of Afghanistan’s most well known
traders came from families who had migrated to Afghan-
istan in the 1920s – theywere respected for their production
and distribution of carpets, the opening of transport com-
panies that connected the cities of northern Afghanistan to
Pakistan, Iran, and Turkey, as well as for establishing busi-
ness and oﬃces abroad, most especially in Hamburg and
Istanbul.
Most of these families however left Afghanistan in the
early 1980s, having been labelled as ‘feudal’ by the com-
munist government and told that their property would be
conﬁscated. Many also feared that anti-government
mujahidin groups would compel their male children to ﬁght.
Most of the traders initially moved to Pakistan: hundreds
of families stayed in cities (notably Peshawar and Lahore)
and eventually establishedworkshops in which carpets were
produced. Other families were able to procure travel docu-
ments that allowed them to travel to Saudi Arabia on
working visas. For large numbers of the traders, obtaining
residency in Saudi Arabia was highly complex – many used
their Pakistani passports to obtain residency, which re-
sulted in diﬃculties in later years when theywished to travel
for Afghanistan. Many others entered Saudi Arabia on spe-
cially designated hajj visas, and overstayed these, often for
several years, until they were either deported or included
in amnesties by the Saudi Arabian authorities. It was also
normal for some family members to have entered on a
working visa while others to be over-stayers on a hajj visa.
Most of the traders say that they were initially involved in
small scale commercial activities in Jeddah and other cities,
buying, for example, inexpensive goods from commodity
wholesalers based in Jeddah and then selling them at street
stalls in the holy cities of Mecca or Medina. The more suc-
cessful traders were able to rent shops in Mecca to cover
the period of the hajj pilgrimage seasonwhen proﬁtmargins
are at their highest.
This community’s speciﬁc migration history has clearly
affected the nature of their relationswith Afghanistan. Unlike
in the other Afghan commercial communities and net-
works that I have explored in this article, the majority of
the men I have spoken to say they have never returned to
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Afghanistan after they left in the early 1980s. Those who
theorise this say it is because they were already refugees
in Afghanistan when they left, having been denied access
to the Afghan national identity card (tazkira) until at some
point in the 1960s. As a result, I am told, they felt little at-
tachment to their homeland and instead sought to lead
settled lives in the contexts to which they moved. Never-
theless, life in Saudi Arabia has also provided the opportunity
for these traders and the communities to which they belong
to explore their histories of connectedness. Saudi Arabia,
like the UAE, operates they kaﬁlah system (a Saudi system
is required to be a partner of the business activities of a res-
ident foreigner): some of my informants have told me that
their kaﬁlah are third generation descendants of 1920
emigres from the Emirate of Bukhara (see Balci, 2003). These
people, they say, have ‘become Arab’ but are still more trust-
worthy partners than Saudi citizens without a shared Central
Asian heritage.
The more successful traders in this community have
increasingly fashioned the Zeytinburnu neighbourhood of
Istanbul as a node for their commercial and affective lives.
They come to Istanbul in the summer to escape the heat
of Jeddah, as well as to order carpets and clothes that are
made in Turkey to be delivered to Saudi Arabia on time
for the great hajj pilgrimage. Many also attend or organise
the weddings of relatives who were resettled in Turkey in
the 1980s as part of oﬃcial programmes organised by the
Turkish government. Indeed, several of the Afghan traders
I have talked with successfully sought to acquire Turkish
citizenship in the 1990s and 2000s. Holding a Turkish
passport they say, raises their status in Saudi Arabia: if
they are to fall foul of the law they are likely to receive
better treatment if they are Turkish citizens than if living
in Saudi on a Pakistani residence permit. Turkish citizen-
ship also gives them a national identity they believe is
durable (many are from families who migrated from the
former Emirate of Bukhara to Afghanistan in the 1920s
and 1930s and claim to have never been fully accepted as
‘Afghan’ citizens). Finally, being Turkish also affords the
children of these trading families access to higher educa-
tion, something they say is very diﬃcult in Saudi: ‘when
our children ﬁnish class 12, we have no choice but to
bring them into the shop or warehouse and start them
trading’. The community of northern Afghans in Istanbul
is growing more and more complex by the day – on the
one hand there are the new wave of commercial investors
from Kabul entering the city, buying property and opening
businesses; on the other hand, the signiﬁcant communi-
ties of Turkmen who continued to reside in Pakistan
(especially Peshawar and Lahore) – where they own carpet
manufacturing and trading business – are increasingly shift-
ing to Turkey as the Pakistan state has become increasingly
hostile to refugees from Afghanistan.
The trading activities of Afghanistan communities in
Saudi Arabia and Istanbul are also varied: many bring tea
shirts and Arab dresses from China to Saudi – ‘hajjis buy
lots of gifts for their relatives and they don’t care about
the quality only the price’. One man I have met in both
Yiwu and Zeytinburnu for example exports to Jeddah
Arab tunics that are made in Yiwu by a company that
employs those interned in Chinese jails as tailors. These
traders also export higher quality Turkish products to
Saudi Arabia, especially clothing and carpets. Some run
their own factories, especially in Zeytinburnu and towns
in the Southeast of Turkey where there are established
communities from northern Afghanistan. It has also been
reported to me that until the onset of war, Afghan traders
would travel from Jeddah to Aleppo in order to purchase
machine-made carpets. The situated choices in terms of
whether to purchase in Turkey or in China or elsewhere in
the Middle East is an important element of the traders’
strategies.
As with the traders based in the former Soviet Union,
merchants involved in the trade between China and the
Middle East, are actively involved in the creation of diasporic
community life in the settings in which they live and
work. One such node of the affective and commercial life
of this community is the old city in Jeddah, especially the
Bukhari Street which has been home to communities of
pilgrims, traders and migrants from Central Asia for over
the past century. As we have already seen, another impor-
tant neighbourhood in which commerce and familial
life overlap for this community is the Zeytinburnu
neighbourhood of Istanbul. Istanbul’s Zeytinburnu
neighbourhood has been home to Afghans of largely Uzbek
and Turkmen background since the mid-1980s, but in the
last four years the neighbourhood has become a vibrant
site of Afghan sociability – not merely of Afghans seeking
to travel to Europe. In the last four years, Zeytinburnu has
become a vibrant site of Afghan sociability – not only of
those coming to Europe about whom one reads a great
deal in the news: many have moved here to trade and do
business and have come from all over Eurasia. During visits
to Istanbul that I made in July and October 2016, I met in
the streets of Zeytinburnu traders that I have known in
Tajikistan and Ukraine, as well as Yiwu and Kabul. There
is a veritable assortment of Afghan restaurants and ‘watani’
handmade ice cream parlours to choose from. These are a
real spectacle for Afghans and locals alike as the ice cream
makers, who hail from northern Afghanistan, make their
special delicacy by pounding cold cream in steel pots that
are submerged in ice. Equally important are the commu-
nity associations (vakif) that have been established by
Jeddah-based traders in Istanbul. These are gathering spaces
usually located in apartments or ﬂats that have been oﬃ-
cially registered with the Turkish state and that are used
to hold community events, such as the funeral prayers for
the deceased, wedding rituals, or meals organised as acts
of charitable giving.
The distinctive element of the Afghan networks that fa-
cilitate the ﬂows of commodities from China to Saudi Arabia
is the extent to which the thinking and experiences of the
people who make up these networks are clearly informed
by several generations of mobility and migration associ-
ated with both trade as well as political displacement. As
a result, these traders have played an active role in seeking
to establish and sustain sites of familial and affective life that
are less visible in the context of both the traders in the Soviet
Union or the peripatetic gemstone dealers. It is also notable
that for many of the traders in Saudi Arabia, questions of
identity and belonging, as well as strategic moves concern-
ing how to ﬁnd permanent homes for their families, are
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especially paramount and indeed addressed on a day-to-
day level.
6. Conclusion
Any one of the hundreds of thousands of Afghans with
experience of trading across the borders of Central Asia,
China, the Middle East and Europe over the past thirty years
will tell the architects of the New Silk Road strategy that
the barriers to the types of trade that will have positive con-
sequences for local people will not be dealt with through
romantic visions of interconnectivity fashioned by elite poli-
ticians who gather at international hotels. It is in themarkets
and bazaars in which commerce and exchange actually takes
place where the conditions for connectivity will be fash-
ioned. Creating regional interdependence requires social
work as much as narrowly economic policy. It requires the
making of relationships of friendship and of commerce
across the boundaries of ethnicity, language, nationality, re-
ligion, and political ideology. It requires the ability to
compromise with the powerful and the corrupt. It re-
quires the skills to learn multiple languages. It requires the
capacity of individuals and groups to feel at home every-
where. As many of the traders themselves say, ‘we are both
traders and diplomats’.
The carefully managed and regulated ﬂows of commodi-
ties, goods, products, and people envisaged in the New Silk
Road strategy will constrain rather than facilitate the ﬂour-
ishing of the social, cultural and political skills that are
necessary for durable forms of regional interconnectivity.
A Eurasia without the forms of adaptability and ﬂexibility
amply demonstrated by Afghan traders will be a far bleaker
space. The absence of the diplomatic yet socially valued ca-
pacities they display on a daily basis will also mean that
conﬂicts across the region’smultiple boundaries will bemore
not less likely to erupt.
The current fascination with grandiose plans such as the
New Silk Road conceal the intricate networks that already
do exist and that successfully connect different parts of
Europe and Asia to one another. These Actually Existing Silk
Roads should not be treated as informal and illegal and
thereby inevitably a security threat or a risk. They are better
thought of as monuments to the creative activity of people
who have been poorly served by the nation-state and the
international system over the past decades. It is in this
context that they have built their own infrastructures, both
for life and for commerce.
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